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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DOYLE MAX WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS,

Case No. 17596

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section
35

-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial review of a decision of the

Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which denied Plaintiff unemployment
compensation for a period of six weeks.
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DISPOSITION BELOW
A Department Representative denied unemployment benefits to Plaintiff/ Appellant
(hereinafter referred to as "claimant"), and claimant appealed. After due notice and hearing, an
Appeal Referee for the Industrial Commission affirmed the Department's denial of benefits by
decision dated December 30, 1980. The decision of the Appeal Referee was affirmed by the
Board of Review by decision in Case No. 80-A-4579, 81-BR-19, dated February 24, 1981, and
issued February 27, 1981.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board of Review and the Appeal Referee.
Defendant seeks affirmance of such decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Claimant's Statement of Facts is very brief, leaves out facts pertinent to the issue before the
court, and is substantially composed of argument. Therefore, Defendant offers the following
summary of the facts:
Prior to filing for unemployment insurance benefits effective October 19, 1980, claimant
had been employed as a layout man for Eaton Metal Products from January23, 1978, (R. 0029)
or 1979, (R.0017, 0012) to October 17, 1980. (R.0029) The claimant converted to the Christian
Church and subsequently quit his job in Salt Lake City to move to Indiana for the purpose of
seeking religious fellowship with members of his own church. (R. 0012, 0018)

ARGUMENT
POINTI
THAT IN REVIEWING A DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM THE
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established. Section
35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953; Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 Ut. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587
(1978). This court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission are
supported by evidence, they will not be disturbed. Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v.
Industrial Commission, 104 Ut. 242, 139 P. 2d 208. A reversal of an order of the Department
denying compensation can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the
determination and the facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the
Department's denial is clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Kennecott Copper
Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 Ut. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987
(1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 Ut. 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44 (1966).
POINT II
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT IS TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO
ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTS BUT SUCH RULE DOES NOT PERMIT AN EXTENSION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO ONE WHOSE INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT MAY BE VOLITIONAL.
Section 35-4-5(a) provides:
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes establishing a
waiting period:
(a) for the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good
cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter until the
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and
earned wages for such services equal to at least six times the claimant's
weekly benefit amount; provided that no claimant shall be ineligible for
benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a nature
that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a
disqualification.
The commission shall in cooperation with the employer consider for the
purposes of this act, the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the
extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to
the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a
claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
3
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is a generally acknowledged rule that Employment Security statutes are construed
liberally to accomplish their purposes and objectives. However, in Utah and elsewhere the
courts construe such statutes in a manner which distinguishes those petitioning as benefi.
ciaries of the Act who become unemployed for reasons attributable to themselves. This court
has previously pointed out that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist the
worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his part. Kennecott

Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, supra. The court has
also noted that the underlying legislative intent of the various disqualifying provisions of the
Act is that the Department is to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation by adhering to the volitional test, and declared the policy of the contributions provisions of
the statute to be to establish financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed through
no fault of their own. Olaf Nelson Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 121 Ut.
521, 243, P. 2d 951 (1952).
This court has recently held that:
The initial determination of "good cause" for voluntarily leaving
employment is a mixed question of law and fact for the administrative agency. A claimant has the burden of showing good cause
for leaving when he voluntarily terminates suitable employment.
"Good cause" has been defined as "such cause as would similarly
affect persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity, and is limited
to those instances where the unemployment is caused by external
pressures so compelling that a reasonable prudent person, exercising ordinary common sense and prudence, would be justified in
quitting under similar circumstances." Denby v. Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah) 567 P. 2d 630 (1977).
(Citations omitted.)
There is no dispute that claimant left his work with Eaton Metal Products voluntarily. (A.
0010, 0028) Claimant contends that he had good cause for voluntarily leaving work in order to
exercise his right to freedom of religion without harassment or hardship because of his beliefs.
(Plaintiff's Brief, page 2.) The Appeal Referee, as affirmed by the Board of Review, found that
the claimant left work to move to Indiana which is the seat of the claimant's religious belief, to
seek religious fellowship with members of his own church. (R. 0012) The Appeal Referee further
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found that the job conditions under which the claimant worked were not so adverse as to
compel immediate separation before the claimant had found other work. (R. 0013) The factual
issue thus presented is whether the evidence supports the finding of the Appeal Referee that
claimant's quit was to seek religious fellowship elsewhere or, as claimant contends, because of
harassment. The applicable standards to determine "good cause" are standards of reasonableness, and the question of good cause is to be determined from the circumstances of each
individual case. Stevenson v. Morgan, 17 Or. App. 428, 522 P. 2d 1204, 1206 (1974); Wilton v.
Employment Division, 26 Or. App. 549, 553 P. 2d 1071 (1976). That claimant's reasons for
leaving his employment under the particular circumstances of his case do not fall within the
standards of "good cause" as set forth in the Denby case, supra, is evident from the record, as
will be shown in Point Ill herein. The issue of law presented by this case is whether the First
Amendment Right of Freedom of Religion extends the benefits of the unemployment insurance
program to a claimant who quits work to seek religious fellowship in another community. In this
regard it should be noted that "good cause" for leaving work has been interpreted by the
Industrial Commission to include a good faith leaving on religious grounds. General Rules of
Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving, Section 90. However, good faith leaving on religious grounds
does not include a// religious reasons for leaving work, no matter how remotely related to the
work such reasons may be, but rather to those instances where conflict arises between the
claimant's work and religious beliefs. This matter is more fully discussed in Point Ill hereof.
POINT Ill
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE APPEAL REFEREE THAT
CLAIMANT VOLUNTARIL y LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE IS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION.
The claimant apparently contends on appeal to the court that he quit his job with Eaton
Metal Products due to harassment because of his religious beliefs. (See appeal to Board of
Review, R. 0010; and Appellant's Brief, Statement of the Nature of the Case, page 1.) The
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Appeal Referee, as affirmed by the Board of Review, specifically found, however, that
claimant left work" ... to move to Indiana to seek religious fellowship with members of his own
church." (R. 0012) This finding is amply supported by the record.
The claimant filed his claim for unemployment benefits in October 21, 1980, (R. 0029) at
which time he also completed a Statement On Voluntary Quit (R. 0028). Two responses to the
questions therein illuminate the claimant's mental attitude at the time he quit:
"What was the main reason you left work?
[sic] conflicts with parts of family."

Moving because of family and religon

"Explain why you felt it was necessary for you to quit. List all facts that you feel are
important.
Moving to Ind. because religon [sic] conflicts between certain parts of
the family. Job was slow so I felt it was a good time to move. Had planded [sic] to move
for some time." (R. 0028)
These statements were later supported by the claimant's testimony before the Appeal
Referee:
Referee

Why was it that you left your employment?

Mr. Wilson

When I grew up I was raised in a family in the L.D.S. religion.

Referee

L.D.S. is Latter Day Saints or what?

Mr. Wilson

Latter Day Saints. It was only natural that I would follow that religion up
until I decided to search on my own for my beliefs and whatnot. I got
married and my wife became L.D.S., but we didn't feel right with that so
later on we became Christians, following under a man by the name of
William (inaudible)--

Referee

--William Brannam?

Mr. Wilson

There just wasn't anybody that believed in what we believed around so it
caused a lot of family conflicts and as far as working goes I just didn't feel
right working around the people that I had been working around due to
religious beliefs.

Referee

You mean the people on the job had a different belief?

Mr. Wilson

Well, there wasn't a lot of conflict. It was just language and that kind of
stuff.
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Referee

You mean they used curse words or what?

Mr. Wilson

Yes.

Referee

Did you make a complaint to the employer regarding the use of language?

Mr. Wilson

No. I didn't want to bring religion up as the reason I quit. I didn't want to
use religion--

Referee

How many followers does he have?

Mr. Wilson

He's got--well, there's followers all over but the major part of its right here
in Jeffersonville, Indiana. Jeffersonville, Indiana, is where he called his
headquarters and he is deceased now. There are tapes and books and
everything on him and 1--me and my wife just didn't feel comfortable
without people we could fellowship with and stuff so we decided to move
and the best place we figured we could move is where people believed the
same way we believe.

Referee

How do his teachings differ from others? Say a Methodist or a Baptist or a
Catholic?

Mr. Wilson

Christians live (inaudible) and you want to live like Christ did, I guess you
have to try to be (inaudible) and I wasn't ever raised that way so its been a
struggle for me and I just had to be around people who believe the way I
did and who didn't look down on me for the way I believe. His teachings
are 100% by the Bible and I guess everybody has prophets and I believe he
was a true prophet and so he's the man I want to follow and look toward.
There just--my parents being L.D.S. there was a conflict and I just had to
move away so I came here because here is--my wife has a couple of
relatives here and they follow William Brannam and we needed some
fellowship. Since we've been here we've got it and things are going really
smooth. Its just being around people who believe the way you believe so
you don't have all the headaches and you don't have people making fun of
you.

Referee

Did your co-workers make fun of you?

Mr. Wilson

No. They were always having beer parties and every once in a while they
had beer at work. I use to be involved in it and when I started following this
Christianity it changed my life and then people would look at me for what I
was and not for what I became. There was just--not so much the guys I
worked with, they were good guys and everything, it was how I felt inside
myself. (R. 0017, 0018)

Such statements are clear and convincing evidence that the claimant left work to seek
religious fellowship in Indiana. Although the claimant cannot be faulted for desiring to live
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among those who believe the same as he, such desire does not constitute "good cause" within
the meaning and intent of Section 5(a) of the Employment Security Act, and denial of benefits
does not infringe on claimant's right to the free exercise of his religion.
One alleging infringement of the First Amendment free exercise clause has the burden"to
show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his
religion." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 222, 223, S. Ct. 1560 (1962). Thus, in
the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963), the claimant
had been discharged by her employer for refusing to work on Saturday, which is the Sabbath
Day of her faith. The claimant had become a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in
1957, when her employer did not require Saturday work. In 1959 the employer found ii
necessary to require work on Saturdays. The United States Supreme Court held that the lower
court ruling which upheld a denial of benefits forced the claimant to choose between giving up
her right to unemployment benefits or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work. In the more recent case of Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Emp/oymenl

Security Division, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981 ), the claimant had worked in his employer's roll foundry
which fabricated sheet steel for a variety of uses, but when the foundry was closed he was
transferred to a department that fabricated turrets for military tanks. All other departments to
which transfer might have been sought were engaged directly in the production of weapons, so
claimant asked to be laid off. When his request was denied, the claimant quit because his
religious belief precluded him from aiding in the production of items used in warfare. The Court
reversed the denial of benefits, saying through Mr. Chief Justice Burger:
Here, as in Sherbert, the employee was put to a choice between
fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work; the coercive impact
on Thomas is indistinguishable from Sherbert, where the Court
held:
(N]ot only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives soley from the practices of her
religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that
practice is unmistakable [citation omitted]. Id. at 1432.
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The Chief Justice further explained the principle of law involved in cases such as this as
follows:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on the adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. Id.
The other cases cited by claimant are in accord with Sherbert and Thomas.
In the instant case a denial of benefits hampers claimant's personal desire to have fellowship
with others of his faith. but does not in any manner coerce the claimant to engage in conduct
proscribed by his religion or to deny benefits because the claimant engages in conduct
required by his religion. In other words, the claimant's employment had no impact on the
exercise of his religious beliefs, as evidenced by the claimant's testimony:
Referee

Did your co-workers make fun of you? Did your employer make fun
of you?

Mr. Wilson

No. They were always having beer parties and every once in a while they
had beer at work. I used to be involved in it and when I started following
this Christianity it changed my life and then people would look at me for
what I was and not for what I became. There was just--not so much the
guys I worked with, they were good guys and everything, it was just how I
felt inside myself. (R. 0018 Emphasis added.)

It is very likely that the claimant made the right decision in moving to Indiana insofar as his
personal happiness and contentment are concerned. Individuals often quit work to satisfy
personal needs, such as to obtain higher pay. better working conditions or fringe benefits, to be
near to (or farther from) other family members, to move to a nicer locale, etc. Such reasons for
leaving work are often good personal reasons. However. unless the claimant has obtained
definite assurance of other work to go to, such leaving for personal reasons is non-compelling
and does not entitle the claimant to the benefits of the unemployment insurance program.
Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah) 567 P. 2d 630 (1977).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
9 Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
The evidence in this matter is clear and convincing that claimant left work in Utah to seek
religious fellowship in Indiana. The record is also clear that claimant had planned on moving to
Indiana for some time because of religious conflicts with some members of his family
However, claimant has made no showing that religious beliefs or problems on the job
compelled him to quit work before he had obtained new work to which he could go upon
leaving Utah. Given the set of facts which exist in this case, there is no alternative but to apply
the disqualifying provisions of Section S(a) of the Act. The decision of the Board of Review
should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this _ _ _ _ _ day of June, 1981.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General of Utah
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General

BY------------K. Allan Zabel
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Defendant's Brief to
Doyle Max Wilson, Pro Se, 1912 Tennyson Drive, Clarksville, Indiana 47130, this _ _ _ __
day of June, 1981.

K. Allan Zabel
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